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he issue of the inﬂuence of norms on behavior is as old as sociology itself. This paper explores the effect of normative homophily (i.e. “sharing the same normative 
hoices”) on the evolution of the advice network among lay judges in a courthouse. Blau’s (1955, 1964) social exchange theory suggests that members select 
dvisors based on the status of the advisor. Additional research shows that members of an organization use similarities with others in ascribed, achieved or 
nherited characteristics, as well as other kinds of ties, to mitigate the potentially negative effects of this strong status rule. We elaborate and test these theories 
sing data on advisor choice in the Commercial Court of Paris. We use a jurisprudential case about unfair competition (material and “moral” damages), a case that 
e submitted to all the judges of this court, to test the effect of normative homophily on the selection of advisors, controlling for status effects. Normative homophily 
s measured by the extent to which two judges are equally “punitive” in awarding damages to plaintiffs. Statistical analyses combine longitudinal advice network data 
ollected among the judges with their normative dispositions. Contrary to what could be expected from conventional sociological theories, we ﬁnd no pure effect of 
ormative homophily on the choice of advisors. In this case, therefore, sharing the same norms and values does not have, by itself, a mitigating effect and does not 
ontribute to the evolution of the network. We argue that status effects, conformity and alignments on positions of opinion leaders in controversies still provide the 
est insights into the relationship between norms, structure and behavior.
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-. Introduction
Intra-organizational learning has long been considered an
mportant process in organizations. Learning as a relational process
an be captured in part through the study of advice networks. An
dvicenetwork represents a setofpaths throughwhichappropriate
nformation circulates amongmembersof anorganized setting. The
llocation of this resource through informal ties and interactions
educes the costs of its acquisition during the process of making
ecisions to solve problems. Members of organizations see exper-
ise and experience as being accumulated by the organization, and
hey rely constantly on advice fromothers, especially in knowledge
ntensive organizations.Blau’s (1955, 1964) social exchange theory suggests that mem-
ers select advisors basedon the status of the advisor. They can thus
ry to exchange status recognition for advice. Advisors are sensitive
o this recognitionof their status and this gives theman incentive to
hare their expertise or judgment with the advice seeker. Because
dvice networks are usually shaped by such status games, they are
sually highly centralized. They exhibit a pecking order that often
losely follows the hierarchical structure of the organization.
-
lHowever, an additional process is triggered by social exchange
of advice for recognition of status. It has been shown that member
use similarities with others in ascribed, achieved or inherited char
acteristics, as well as other kinds of ties, to mitigate the potentially
negative effects of this strong status rule for intra-organizationa
learning. Previous research (e.g. Lazega and Van Duijn, 1997
McPherson et al., 2001) has highlighted the importance of similar
ities, which may in some cases reduce transaction costs between
exchange partners.
One consequence is that this lowers the exchange rate between
advice and status. In effect, similarity calls for a certain solidarity
between exchange partners and because of this solidarity, advice
from similar others requires less in terms of giving status recogni
tion. If costs of advice are lower in the case of similar others, then
less status needs to be given in return. This, and other theoretica
arguments mentioned in the next section, leads to the expectation
of homophily in the selection of advisors.
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manage and mitigate status games. For example, analyses of mul-
tiplexity in social exchanges in organizations suggest that co-work
and friendship ties lead to the creation of advice ties (Lazega andOur main purpose is to further examine this homophilous miti-
ation process based on the use of similarities between the advice
eeker and the advisor. In this paper we present a network study of
speciﬁc basis for the selection of advisors, namely shared norms
nd values. The study is about the Commercial Court of Paris, a
rst-level court that deals with complex commercial litigation and
ankruptcies in the French capital.
The Commercial Court of Paris is an interesting institution
ecause it represents a case of institutionalized “joint regulation”
f markets (Lazega and Mounier, 2003). Judges in this court are
ay and voluntary (unpaid) judges, experienced business men and
omen who are elected/co-opted by the business community at
he local Chamber of Commerce. These lay judges are truly judi-
ial. They are sworn in, as any career judge would be. But they still
epresent a form of cooperation between business and the State
n which business manages to be actually part of the State appa-
atus. In effect, in order to be elected/co-opted, these judges must
e sponsored by a trade association. The latter selects candidates
ho – it hopes – will mobilize the norms of their business sector
hen making judicial decisions in cases in which they have some
egree of discretion. This raises issues of conﬂicts of interests that
avebeenpointedout as soonas this institutionwasborn (in 1563),
ut have not prevented survival of the institution for four and a half
enturies (Denière, 1972; Genevois, 1866; Ithurbide, 1970; Kessler,
007; Lemercier, 2008). The main arguments used by lay judges
o legitimize this institution are that they volunteer (they do not
eceive a salary for their work as a judge) and are therefore less
xpensive for the government than career judges; and that they
ool and share their expertise of business and economics, an exper-
ise that career judges are less likely to have. Seeking and sharing
dvice is thus encouraged among them, which is why they let us
bserve their advice network in the ﬁrst place.
In the investigation, lay judges were interviewed using a lon-
itudinal design with three repeated measures. Two types of
mpirical data support our illustrations and analyses. Firstly, the
udges were interviewed about their advice relationships within
he Court. Secondly, they were also interviewed about speciﬁc
ormative choices as a result of a controversy in the Court. The
ormative controversy among the judges was about the extent to
hich they should be punitive in their judicial decisions on mat-
ers of unfair competition between entrepreneurs. Being punitive
eant – in French law– awarding the injured party not only “mate-
ial” damages (i.e. amounts of money that make up for the actual
conomic losses incurred due to the unfair business practices of the
ffender), but also awarding them “moral” damages (i.e. amounts
f money that are meant, as a pecuniary punishment, to teach a
esson and dissuade the offender from getting involved in such
ractices again, given that such practices break the “natural” cir-
uits ofmarkets). Hence, beingpunitivemeant imposing extra costs
n offenders: not only the cost of repairing the damage suffered by
he victim, but the implicit cost of the collective damage done to
he “free market” in general. Punitive decisions radicalize the free-
arket point of view thatwas already that of themajority of judges
t the Court. Punitive judges argue that if extra blame and punish-
ent arenotpresent, there is a strong riskofderesponsibilizationof
ommercial practices. Non-punitive judges argue that this kind of
unitivity should characterize criminal courts, not civil court such
s their own institution, which should focus in priority on helping
he parties do business again. Punitivity is thus a core issue in how
he judges view their role and the inﬂuence of their court onmarket
iscipline and commercial practice. Accordingly, it was central in
dentifying normative differences in opinion within the Court.Data on the deeply rooted normative attitude (whether punitive
r non-punitive) of each judge in this controversy were collected
sing qualitative interviews based on a vignette inspired by a real
ife case. We took advantage of the fact that we were indeed able toobserve ethnographically an open controversy (not simply differ-
ences in opinion) between punitive and non-punitive judges in the
court a year before wave 3 was carried out. This controversy was
thus used to test our ideas about the relationship between norms
and dynamics of networks.
We use an actor-based stochastic network model (Snijders,
2001, 2005; Snijders et al., in this issue) to test ourhypotheses about
the relative effect of status vs. normative homophily on the selec-
tion of advisors and the relational turnover in the advice network.
We ﬁrst present the theoretical background available on advice
networks and collective learning, then our hypotheses about the
effect of norms on the selection of advisors. Next we describe our
empirical setting and focus on a normative choice made by the
judges. Finally, we test our hypotheses using these data. Our main
result is that there is no direct effect of normative homophily on
the selection of advisors. We ﬁnd that status effects are dominant
in this organizational context, and normative homophily does not
compete at all here with the effect of status. We conclude with a
discussion on the consequences of these results for understanding
collective learning through alignment on ideas and advice coming
from members with status rather than through sharing normative
attitudes.
2. Theoretical background
There is already a rich literature on how members of organi-
zations select their advisors. According to this literature, at least
two kinds of processes drive these relational choices of sources
of advice: social exchange of status recognition for advice on the
one hand; and use of similarities creating homophily on the other
hand. Blau’s (1955, 1964) social exchange theory suggests that
members of an organized setting exchange status recognition for
advice. Advisors are sensitive to this recognition of their status by
the advice seeker and this gives them an incentive to share their
expertise or judgment with the advice seeker on an informal basis.
Research conﬁrms that members tend to seek advice from other
members with higher status; see for example Bapuji and Crossan
(2004), Brass (1984), Krackhardt (1987, 1990), Barley (1990), Ibarra
and Andrews (1993), Lazega (1992, 1995, 2002), Lazega et al.
(2006), Lazega and Van Duijn (1997), Rulke and Galaskiewicz
(2000), Cross et al. (2001), Mizruchi and Stearns (2001), Hansen
(2002), Tsaï (2002), Borgatti and Cross (2003), Kilduff and Tsai
(2003), McDonald and Westphal (2003).
However, such status games can also have very negative effects
on sharing knowledge useful for task performance. Members from
different ranks may ﬁnd all sorts of reasons not to communicate.
Those with lower status may not want to show their superiors,
who are also among their evaluators, that they do not know. Mem-
bers of higher status may not want to lose status by seeking advice
from colleagues “below them” in the formal hierarchy or in the
pecking order. Thus, status games also trigger another, parallel pro-
cess in advice networks. Lazega and Van Duijn (1997), for example,
show that members are aware of such barriers and use similarities
and ties different from advice ties to mitigate the potentially neg-
ative effects of this strong rule for intra-organizational action and
learning.1 Members also use pre-existing ties of different kinds to1 Members feeling insecure about what to do also copy the behavior of others
similarly placed in the social structure (White et al., 1974), and can thus be expected
to seek advice from others who are structurally equivalent. We show elsewhere the
validity of this structural principle using blockmodelling applied to the samedataset
as in this paper (Lazega et al., in press).
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sattison, 1999). In someﬁrms, advice ties are so important that they
lso play an important role in facilitating the ﬂows of other kinds of
esources. Thus, advice networks tend to be both hierarchical and
ohesive (at least within subsets of peers), with the hierarchical
imension usually stronger than the cohesive one.
Various kinds of similarities between advice seekers and advice-
ivers have been identiﬁed as determinants of these homophilous
ndmitigating choices of exchange partners. Ascribed, inherited, as
ell as achieved characteristics can be the basis for homophilous
election. For example, working in the same ofﬁce, being of the
ame level of seniority, and sharing the same specialty, but also
he same gender and the same kind of education have been
hownto facilitate advice seekingamongmembersoforganizations
McPherson et al., 2001 for a review). It is easier, less cumbersome
nd more efﬁcient to interact with persons who are culturally sim-
lar, e.g. speaking one’s native language. In addition, some types of
imilarity might indicate that these people have similar problems
hey have to deal with as you do, and will give recognition to the
ame arguments; therefore they may be good advisors.
To our knowledge, selection of advisors based on shared norms
nd values has not been examined and tested systematically in
he literature. Such a connection would not be surprising from a
ociological perspective. As shown by Durkheim (1922) and many
uccessors, learning is also part of a wider socializing process.
ndeed, one important factor in the exchange literature that could
xplain the creation and maintenance of advice networks is the
orm of reciprocity as deﬁned by classical sociologists such as
auss (1924) andGouldner (1960). The idea that shared norms can
e a basis for selection of exchange partners, and hence of advisors,
an be rooted in this insight. There is a growing body of social-
sychological research on this topic (Cheshire, 2007; Ekeh, 1974)
hat explains why individuals would ask and give advice. More
peciﬁcally, various contributions recognize norms and values, and
ore generally cultural background, as a source of similarities pro-
ucing homophilous choices. Members sharing common norms
nd values also tend to trust each other more and will more eas-
ly recognize the value of the advice given, thus lowering barriers
aised by their organized setting. This could be especially true
n controversies staging normative ambiguities and conﬂicts, and
orcing members to take normative stands in uncertain situations.
dvisors then may be expected to provide advice in order to rein-
orce their shared common perceptions and norms. Centola et al.
2007) divide homophily into three components: values, status,
nd induced homophily. The ﬁrst refers to a psychological attitude
hat justiﬁes opinions when shared with other people (Berelson
t al., 1954). The second relates to interactions with individuals
ho share the same cultural background or social status (Marsden,
988; Breiger, 2004). These two attitudes are caused by a purposive
hoice of the actor in selecting other actors. The third component,
nduced homophily, does not emerge from actors’ choice, but from
nﬂuence dynamics that render individuals inside a group similar
n the course of time. From a different perspective, based on a the-
ry of social capital, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) distinguish three
imensions of social capital in advice networks: a structural part (I
eek advice from my boss because I am supposed to), a relational
art (I seek advice from one of my colleagues because I trust him,
am friend with him, I know him), and a “cognitive” part (I seek
dvice from my colleague because I feel that his values/beliefs are
lose to mine). The latter selection effect is speciﬁcally the kind of
ffect that we would like to test in this paper.
Norms and values can be used by actors to create similarities
f a special kind, signal these similarities to each other, and thus
itigate the effect of status barriers. In this respect, sharing similar
alues with members with higher status may be a basis for selec-
ion of an advisor among many other possible advisors with higher
tatus. But the process of exchanging appropriate knowledge withmembers sharing the same norms and values does not necessarily
exclude or replace status games. Shared attributes and worldview
may thus compete as well as combine with status of the advisor as
a determinant of the selection of advisors.
3. Hypotheses
Based on this theoretical background, we formulate hypothe-
ses concerning the selection of advisors to be tested in our dataset.
Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2 are meant to conﬁrm established knowl-
edge about status games and their mitigation based on homophily
effects,whileHypotheses3and4 introduce thedimensionofnorms
and values. All these hypotheses are to be understood as expecta-
tions about the dynamic process of advisor choice, where current
characteristics of the advicenetwork and the individuals determine
the likelihood of changes in the choice of advisors.
H1a. Members of an organized setting are more likely to seek
advice from colleagues of higher status.
Even though Blau’s status effect is already tested in the litera-
ture, we think that it is important to underline the dynamic nature
of the relation and test it in the data available for this institution.
Since we measure status in terms of formal position as well as
in-degree in the advice network, hypothesis H1a implies a feed-
back process, where high status leads to new, or continued, advisor
choices which have the tendency to conﬁrm existing status dif-
ferentials. Following Lazega et al. (2006), this is expressed in the
following hypothesis, which is a consequence of hypothesis H1a.
H1b. The status of those with highest status will tend to be rein-
forced over time.
The same is true for similarity effects traditionally included in
explanation of selection of advisors.
H2. Members are more likely to seek advice from members with
whom they share ascribed and inherited characteristics.
Having shownhowvarious sociological and psycho-sociological
theories stress the relevanceofnormative similarity,weexpect that
perceived shared values, among other characteristics, can also be
the basis for homophilous mitigation of status games.
H3. Members are more likely to seek advice from members with
whom they share the same values.
Finally, given that status effects and normative similarity can
coexist, we also test their relative strength. Especially if a process
of increasing centralization of the network takes place over time,
status can be expected to be stronger than normative homophily
as a determinant of the selection of an advisor. This leads to the
following statement:
H4. Status is more important than shared values for the dynamics
in advice relations.
Thecombined rolesof statusandnormativehomophilygive spe-
cial importance to the normative values promoted by high-status
members. If the hypotheses are supported, the dynamics of the
advice process will lead to a collective learning process that pro-
motes the latter’s values, not directly because of the values but
indirectly by the alignment on authorities.
4. DataWe test these hypotheses on a dataset collected at the Commer-
cial Court of Paris, an institution which handles 12% of commercial
litigation in France, including very complex cases. As mentioned
above, its judges are experienced business men and women who
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a jurisprudential approach. We looked at the extent to which lay
judges were punitive or non-punitive in their assessment and
awarding of damages, an area in which they have wide discre-obilize both the law and the norms of their business sector in
rder to ﬁnd judicial solutions. They are elected for 2- or 4-year
erms, for a maximum of 14 years. Twenty generalist and special-
zed Chambers, which treat a great variety of cases, make up the
ourt. A formalized rotation rule requires judges to change Cham-
ers each year, an obligation meant to lower the risk of corruption
r conﬂicts of interest.
In the domains of both litigation and bankruptcy, judges often
eal with very complex legal issues in which they have a large
mount of discretion. The uncertainty generated by the cases
reates the need to call on numerous competencies (judicial, eco-
omic, ormanagerial, amongothers), and in factmany judges in this
ommercial court justify this lay institutionwith the argument that
t brings together very diverse skills. The heterogeneity of judges,
ho come from multiple horizons of business, effectively creates
rich knowledge base insofar as each can draw from the others’
xperiences and expertise.
At the time of the study, the lay judges represented very diverse
ectors in which they worked either previously or currently. Thus,
n complex cases, information relating to a speciﬁc industry could
e accessible to the court through judges from that ﬁeld. Theo-
etically all sectors can present candidates to the election of lay
udges on an annual basis in order to ﬁll the vacant posts result-
ng from a turnover rate of 10% in the Court. Nevertheless certain
ectors and/or enterprises invest more than others in “judicial
ntrepreneurship” and shoulder a greater share of the cost of social
ontrol of business because this is in their interest. The largest is
he banking/ﬁnance sector, contributing 29% of the judges in 2002.
n addition, bankers often have a legal education: bank employ-
es with a law degree constitute about 60% of judges from the
hole banking and ﬁnancial business. Yet, the over-representation
f ﬁnance amongst the lay judges does not represent an unchal-
enged dominance of that institution. In fact, a majority of judges
oming from industry, construction, or other areas do not always
ppreciate this dominance. As stated despisingly by a banker with
egal education, commenting on these tensions: “shopkeepers hate
ankers.”
.1. Network data
A network dataset was collected in 2000, 2002, and 2005. Each
aveused the samenamegenerator: “Here is the list of all your col-
eagues at this Court, including the President andVice-Presidents of
he Court, the Presidents of Chambers, the judges, and ‘wise-men.’
will ask you a question and you need only indicate the colleagues
oncerned. Using this list, please check the colleagues whom you
ave asked for advice during the last 2 years concerning a complex
ase, or with whom you have had basic discussions, outside formal
eliberations, in order to get a different point of view on the case.”
very high response rate (87% on average for the three waves)
llows for the reconstitution, at each measurement, of the com-
lete advice network existing between the judges, whose number
aried between 151 and 156 from 2000 to 2005.
The data ﬁle we use includes the 86 judges who responded at
ach of the three waves. The main reasons for disregarding the few
issing data and, more notably, the changing composition of the
ourt (with individuals that join and leave every year owing to
he yearly election of new members, the ﬁxed term mandate, etc.)
re that these judges provide most information about the changes
n the advice ties, and a considerable reduction of time necessary
or estimations. In many respects, the set of 86 judges for whom
ata are complete does not signiﬁcantly differ from the larger set
f judges that would be obtained by including all judges that have
een present at the Court at least once in 2000, 2002 or 2005. The
istribution of in-degrees and out-degrees, the minima, maxima,
nd means of covariates, and the similarity scores for covariatesare similar for the two sets. The set of 86 judges for whom data are
complete can thus be regarded as sufﬁciently representative of the
characteristics of the network that needs to be investigated. In esti-
mations including judges who joined or left the Court between the
ﬁrst and last wave of data collection, we obtained roughly similar
results.
Of these 86 judges, 27 come from the banking and ﬁnancial
sector, and 16 of them have legal education. The other 59 judges
are from the non-ﬁnancial sector, with the following breakdown:
15 are from Industry, 16 from Trade, 11 from Building and Pub-
lic Works, and 17 from Services. Regarding employment status,
52 judges were active in period 2000–2002, while only 39 were
active in 2002–2005; from the ﬁrst to the second period, 18 judges
switched fromactivity to inactivity (mainly retirement), while only
5 did the opposite.
4.2. Eliciting normative choices
Observing judges’work is difﬁcult in general: they speak little in
order to preserve their independence. Furthermore, the complexity
of their tasks, in the domains of litigation and bankruptcy, reﬂects
the multiple areas of expertise called for in this type of institution.
Procedures frame and deﬁne judges’ activities, but so do more or
less explicit conﬂicts of norms. During ﬁeldwork, we used the fact
that we were able to observe ethnographically an open normative
controversy between punitive and non-punitive judges in the court
a year before wave 3 was carried out.
The case that divided the court was LVMH vs. Morgan Stanley
(January 12, 2004), a litigation case between the French luxury
company and the American investment bank. In this case, the
ﬁrst Chamber, whose President is also President of the court, con-
demned the bank to 30 million euros in punitive damages. Before
the decision, many judges in the court were pushing for a very dif-
ferent solution (i.e. zero euro for punitive damages). At the time, the
president of the court came from the hotel industry (i.e. was not a
banker). LVMH,world leader in the luxury industry,was suingMor-
gan Stanley and one of its ﬁnancial analysts for «biased analyses»
in the evaluation of its ﬁnancial health. Simultaneously, LVMH was
trying to take over Gucci, another luxury ﬁrm and LVMH’s main
rival, which happened to be aMorgan Stanley client. LVMHclaimed
that there was a conﬂict of interest for Morgan Stanley because of
its close commercial relationship with Gucci. For LVMH, by provid-
ing the stock market with allegedly erroneous information about
the ﬁnances of LVMH, Morgan Stanley was only “denigrating” the
French group and its brands in order to protect its own interests
as a banker and the interests of its client Gucci (which was trying
to resist being taken over). According to LVMH, the «Chinese wall»
that was meant to separate, within Morgan Stanley, ﬁnancial ana-
lysts from investment bankers, did not work. LVMH claimed both
material and moral damages up to 107 million euros. The bank
defended the integrity of its analysts and put forward counter-
claims for damages incurred from a «vexatious, groundless and
abusive» procedure.2
The punitive decision was very controversial within the court. It
was present in everyone’s mind when we used the punitivity case
in Box 1 to elicit normative choices (Wave 3 took place in 2005,
slightly after this case).
In order to elicit normative choices and test for the effect of
normative homophily on the selection of advisors, we opted for2 This decision was partly conﬁrmed by the Court of Appeal in June 2006
(http://www.avocats-publishing.com/LVMH-vs-Morgan-Stanley).
Box 1: With respect to punitivity in the assessment of
damages in a case of unfair competition
A company whose capital is held entirely by the State (des-
ignated “Company G”) is active in the weaponry sector,
particularly in combat tank construction. Company G was
being sued by a competitor (designated “Company M”) on
the allegation that Company G used “predatory prices” in the
market for speed reducers.
Company M asked that the Court ﬁne Company G the sum
of 10 762 900 euros in damages. In addition to the subsidiary
claim, they asked that an expert be appointed to calculate the
loss.
Using its discretionary authority, the Court did not call in an
expert to evaluate the loss.
After an examination of the proﬁt rate and the basis for the
turnover maintained by the plaintiff, as well as an analysis of
moral andmaterial damages and the loss of competitive capac-
ity, the Court evaluated the loss as equal to less than 3% of the
sum initially asked for.
Similarly, on the subject of proﬁt rate the Court declared that
“in heavy industries, where competition is ﬁerce, producers
apply a proﬁt margin of 10–20% to the production costs of the
materials they order,” [but] declared a rate of 10%.
Concerning the basis for the turnover, the Court stated that
Company M did not provide proof of its allegations, and con-
siderably exaggerated the alleged loss.
In the end, the Court declared the absence of all moral damage
and material loss, notably reasoning that “the risks of litigation
are inherent to business and may always arise during the life
t
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ion. This was implemented using the judgment presented in Box
as a vignette3 and asking them to work on this judgment as in
jurisprudential exercise. This was a real case, judged previously
n another French Commercial Court. This data was collected once,
uring wave 3, but we consider the normative choice made by the
udges to be a choice that reﬂects a deeply rooted value and atti-
ude towards punitivity, and thus tends to be stable over time, if
ot hardwired.
This case calls for the evaluation of both “material” and “moral”
amages, and it raises the question of calling in an expert. Judges
ere asked to read this judgment and to comment on it, then to
espond to the following question: “Do you support the recogni-
ion of a moral damage for a moral person4 (yes or no)? Why? If
ou are, what rules do you use to evaluate thismoral damage?” The
udge’s decision in this case is based on Article 420-1 (French Code
f Commerce), and more precisely on its paragraph 32 on preda-
ory pricing, i.e. when “a product’s unit selling price is less than its
ariable unit cost.”
As in the jurisprudential literature, we use the assessment of
moral” damages as an indicator of punitivity, a normative choice
ade by the judges. We measure the degree of punitivity of judges
y asking them whether they recognize, when asked, the right for
corporate entity to claim moral damages. Judges do not all think
n the same way when it comes to such moral damages because
hey do not all proceed in the same way in assessing loss and resti-
ution. A majority of judges (63%) identify themselves as generally
unitive and favorable to the recognition ofmoral damages for cor-
orate entities insofar as substantive lawallows for this recognition
n condition that the existence of such damages be proved (Article
382 of French Civil Code). As mentioned above, their main idea
3 We used a vignette because docket data are not publicly available in this court,
nd were not made available to us.
4 In French company law the term “moral person” refers to any corporate entity.is that the individual loss suffered in the test case goes hand in
hand with collective damage to the whole sector because it implies
the destruction of “natural” market circuits. Hence it conﬂicts with
the pro free-market point of view of the majority of judges at the
Court. In qualitative interviews, the question is then reframed in
terms of the responsibility of businessmen. Punitive judges think
that moral damages are part of the harsh business world, and it
is important to recognize them even if it is often considered inap-
propriate to compensate for them because of lack of proof and the
difﬁculty of assessing them. These judges sometimes also see the
recognition of moral damages as a compensatory element when
they feel material damages have been undervalued. This can be the
case, for example, when a businessman’s reputation or brand is
harmed. As in the example of counterfeiting, it is difﬁcult to quan-
tify such a grievance. Punitive judges think that they should uphold
such claims precisely because they are difﬁcult to quantify and
prove.
A minority of judges, however, reject punitive decisions. They
think that moral damage does not exist per se for companies, and
that punitivity brings in a criminal dimension that should not be
part of their work in a civil law courthouse. Such non-punitive
judges say that they do not use their discretion to uphold such
claims. The non-punitive approach is often popular in business
because it suits the more general ideology of these lay judges about
the necessity of maintaining a working relationship between the
offender and his victim, of re-establishing a link and renegotiating
contracts after the trial. Indeed many lay judges like to claim that
they are mediators who feel close to the litigating parties – who all
belong to the same business community.
A distinct tendency emerges from this analysis: the judges who
have the least seniority in theCourt aremore favorable to the recog-
nition of moral (i.e. punitive) damages for corporate entities than
more senior judges. These “junior judges” argue that, in their daily
work, they experience a business world that has become anomic;
whereas more senior judges attribute this tendency of junior col-
leagues tobemorepunitive to their tendency to thinkof themselves
as “righters of wrongs” as opposed to followers of the Rule of
Law. Another tendency also becomes clear from the analysis of
responses: bankers with a law degree have a strong tendency to be
non-punitive (concurring with the decision presented in the test
case). This may be in part because they felt less concerned by the
case presented in the vignette which is about non-banking indus-
tries; in part because the question of punitivity reminded them of
the LVMH vs. Morgan Stanley case, where they presumably sided
with MS; or in part because bankers are often less directly con-
cerned with what goes on in real, industrial markets (as opposed
to ﬁnancial markets and company boards).
Finally, although a majority of judges call themselves, in the-
ory, rather punitive, 88% of them would not grant moral damages
in this particular case. Several factors may contribute to explaining
this paradox: the fact that judges do not have access to the com-
plete dossier at the time of the interview; the fact that the Court
did not itself grant moral damages in the sample case; but also the
fact that the inﬂuence of norms on behavior cannot be conceived of
as direct. This inﬂuence might rather be mediated by the relation-
ship between the norm and the evolution of the social structure
that we are going to examine. This mediation is illustrated in this
particular case by the fact that all the magistrates who had studied
law and who came from the banking and ﬁnance industry (banker-
lawyers) considered that there was no moral damage in this case.
The banker-lawyers – whose inﬂuence within the Court was men-
tioned above (Lazega and Mounier, 2003) – are then, based on this
information, less punitive than the non-banker-lawyers. The rea-
sons mentioned led us to use in our analysis not the answer to the
question about the decision the judge would take in this particular
case, but only the general punitive attitude.
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rThis conﬂict between judges, basedondeeply rooteddifferences
n attitudes and norms regarding punitivity, fuelled an open con-
roversy within the court after the LVMH vs. Morgan Stanley case.
n this situation, adherence to a normby a high-status sub-group of
udgesmay constitute a driving force for the evolution of the advice
etwork as a whole. Exploring this issue requires introducing such
ormative choices as an independent variable in the model testing
ur hypotheses.
. Model for analysis
The outcome variable in our study is the selection of advice
ies by the judges, and we focus on the evolution over time of
he network composed by these ties. For the analysis we use
he stochastic actor-based model of Snijders (2001). The analy-
is was carried out using Siena version 3.1 (Snijders et al., 2008).
his model postulates that the existing network structure has
ffects on the changes in selection of advisors, speciﬁes these
ffects, and takes into consideration interdependencebetween ties.
he network observed at wave 1 is accepted as given, and the
odel uses the observed networks at waves 2 and 3 as dependent
ariables.
A brief sketch of the model is as follows; for a fuller treatment
ee Snijders (2001) or Snijders et al. (in this issue). The model
ntends to represent the development of the network observed
t the ﬁrst to that observed at the second observation, and like-
ise the development from the second to the third observation, in
plausible way as the results of consecutive changes of advisor
hoice: creation of new ties (i.e. new advisor choices) and ter-
ination of existing ties (i.e. dropping advisors). These changes
re assumed to have occurred sequentially between the obser-
ations, and the members are assumed to be cognizant of them
nd thus to have full knowledge of the changing network. This
s a reasonable ﬁrst-order approximation. Each of the changes of
dvisor is regarded as a choice made by the member requesting
dvice, who in making this choice takes into account the cur-
ent state of the entire advice network, incorporating all changes
n advisor choice made until the current moment. The probabil-
ty distribution of these choices is modeled as being dependent
n the so-called objective function, which is a function of the
ersonal network of the member making the current choice. Prob-
bilities of change are higher toward network states having a
igher value of the objective function; thus, the objective func-
ion can be loosely regarded as representing the attractiveness
f the network, as seen from the viewpoint of the member con-
erned. The objective function is a linear combination of terms
alled ‘effects’ similar to the linear predictor in generalized linear
odeling. The weights of these effects are the parameters in the
tatistical model, and are estimated from the data by a generalized
ethod of moments. Each effect represents a component poten-
ially driving the network dynamics. Some effects depend on the
urrent network itself (endogenous effects such as reciprocity or
ransitivity of choice), others on the characteristics of the mem-
er making the choice and the member chosen (e.g. homophily
ffects). The model speciﬁcation consists of ﬁrst specifying the
ndogenous, i.e. network-dependent effects that are hypothesized
odrive thenetworkevolution, and second thehypothesizedeffects
f exogenous variables, i.e. attributes of actors or pairs of actors
hat are determined outside of the network. This speciﬁcation
ust include effects reﬂecting the hypotheses but also effectseﬂecting other mechanisms known or suspected to drive network
ynamics, in order to rule out alternative explanations (similar
o control variables in regression models) and to provide a good
odel ﬁt so that the standard errors of the parameter estimates are
eliable.5.1. Variables
The main variables used reﬂect the hypotheses about status,
ascribed and inherited characteristics, and values. Formal status
is represented by the ofﬁcial roles and responsibilities within the
Court. Speciﬁcally, we use dummy variables to distinguish Presi-
dents of Chambers and “Presidents Rattachés” from other judges.
Both are formal roles that reﬂect hierarchy and strongly depend
on judges’ seniority (in terms of tenure in the organization). Judges
can become Presidents of Chambers after serving in the institu-
tion for at least 8 years. Those who were Presidents of Chamber
in the past, and are still in the Court, are Presidents Rattachés –
a category which also includes advisors to the President of the
Court. Presidents of Chamber have formal duties and responsibili-
ties associatedwith running a Chamber,while Presidents Rattachés
no longer have these responsibilities, but are still considered as
high-status members. We have conceptualized both as changing
explanatory variables, taking into account changes in status that
have occurred between the ﬁrst and the second periods of obser-
vation (resp. 2000–2002 and 2002–2005).
Informal status is represented by the judge’s in-degree deﬁned
as the number of advice choices received. The distribution of
in-degrees is very uneven; a large majority of judges receive rel-
atively few choices, while a small core of very central judges have
extremely high in-degrees. We represent this core by a category
called the super-central advisors, deﬁned as the members who (1)
hold special formal responsibilities at theCourt, and (2)haveabove-
average in-degrees at each observation of the network, with the
in-degree exceeding the average plus 3 times the standard error
at least once. This category comprises ﬁve individuals. A judge’s
out-degree deﬁned as the number of his or her advisors can also be
taken as a secondary indicator of status: to the extent that it reveals
lack of knowledge and/or of self-conﬁdence, an intense advice-
seeking activity signals low status. Summarizing, status is reﬂected
by ﬁve variables: Presidents and Presidents Rattachés (formal), in-
degree (informal), super-central advisors (combination of formal
and informal), out-degree (informal, secondary).
The in-degrees and out-degrees thus have the dual role of
independent variables, and reﬂections of the dependent variables
(which are the tie changes). This poses no logical problems because
these two roles are separated in the dynamic model that we use
here: at any moment in time the current in-degrees are among
the predictors for creation of new ties and maintenance of existing
ties. Such a dual role is a necessary component of any model that
expresses feedback.
The ascribed and inherited characteristics used in this analysis
refer to sub-groups and similarities on which homophilous choices
of advisors are likely to be based within the organization. Classiﬁ-
cation in sub-groups mainly depends on the sectors of professional
activity from which members of the Court originate, with a strong
dividing line between judges coming from the banking and ﬁnance
industries and judges fromthenon-ﬁnancial sector. This distinction
can be combined with differences in specialization of judges, par-
ticularly the distinction between those who have a legal education
and those who do not. The banking and ﬁnance sector tradition-
ally provides the Court with many more judges with expertise in
legal matters, relative to other sectors. Other characteristics in this
regardare employment status (whether judges are activeor retired,
which is ameaningful divide in this organizationwhere judgeswith
a job to perform outside the court value rapidity and reliance on
experts much more than judges who are retired from their busi-
ness); and the judges’ education, represented by being alumni of
prestigious, elite schools or of business schools.
Another organizational aspect, used as a control variable, is cap-
tured by Chamber co-membership. This reﬂects the division of
work and functional interdependencies in the organization which
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oay alsobemobilized systematically tomakehomophilous choices
f advisors, because it is less costly in terms of time and energy
o seek advice from members of one’s own chamber. Two judges
ho are in the same Chamber have closer or more frequent con-
acts. Chamber co-membership is a changing dyadic variable, for
hich the changes keep track of new co-memberships between
he ﬁrst and the second periods of observation (resp. 2000–2002
nd 2002–2005).
Values are represented by a measure of judges’ normative ori-
ntations, aiming to capture their acceptance of particular norms.
s outlined in the previous section, we operationalize normative
rientations by a variable indicating their punitive or non-punitive
ttitude toward a company accused of unfair competition (in this
ase: price dumping) because it is a good indicator of their view
f the “free market” mechanism and consequently, of the possible
ole of regulators.
We also control for homophily effects that may arise from
mployment status (whether judges are active); and for judges’
ducation.
.2. Model speciﬁcation
We specify the model by listing the effects mentioned above in
he description of the analysis model and which are the explana-
ory variables for network change. These reﬂect the hypotheses and
ther effects that are likely to drive the evolution of the network,
n line with what is known in general about network dynamics
Snijders et al., in this issue). They are meant to account for path-
ependency in network evolution and may be regarded as control
ffects and as ways to represent the dependency between network
ies in order to better understand the dynamics of the advice net-
ork.
First, we control for the effect of local sub-structures because
echanisms such as reciprocity, transitivity, hierarchy, and gener-
lized exchange are well known in the literature as drivers of the
volution of networks. Reciprocity captures the tendency for an
ctor to form an advice tie with those who seek advice from him
r her, and is reﬂected in the objective function by the number of
utual ties of each given actor i. The transitive triplets effect refers
o the propensity to seek advice from one’s advisor’s advisor, and is
eﬁned by the number of transitive patterns in actor i’s relations,
.e. ordered pairs of actors (j, h) to both of whom i is tied, while j
s also tied to h. The three-cycle effect captures a tendency for the
ormation of short cycles of generalized exchange and depends on
he number of three-cycles in i’s personal advice relationships, i.e.
ycles in which i seeks advice from j, j from k and k from i. The
onjunction of a positive transitive triplets effect accompanied by
negative three-cycles effect may be regarded as a local hierarchy
n advice.
The effects of in-degrees and out-degrees must be adequately
epresented in the model, both because of their direct importance
nd as controls for the other tested effects. This is proposed in
nijders et al. (in this issue), and is especially important to obtain
good model ﬁt for networks with very skewed degree distribu-
ions such as advice networks. In accordance with the advice in
he mentioned paper, three degree-related effects are included,
elating to, respectively, the dispersion (variance) of in-degrees, the
ssociation (correlation) between in- and out-degrees, and the dis-
ersion (variance) of the out-degrees. First, in-degree popularity
sqrt) is deﬁned as the sum of the square roots of in-degrees of a
udge’s advisors. As in-degrees are indicators of status, this mea-
ures the aggregate status of the advisors of the judge in question.
he square roots are used because we assume that a higher in-
egree indicates a higher status (monotonicity), but the effect on
tatus of an increased in-degree becomes lower at higher values
f the in-degree (decreasing marginal effect). A positive parame-ter for this effect indicates that judges with higher in-degrees are
more attractive as advisors, and hence indicates a self-reinforcing
effect of status as reﬂected by in-degrees, that leads to a relatively
high dispersion of the in-degrees. Second, out-degree popularity
(sqrt) is deﬁned as the sum of the square roots of out-degrees
of a judge’s advisors. When this effect is positive, judges with
higher out-degrees are more attractive as advisors, resulting in a
relatively high association between in-degrees and out-degrees.
Because higher out-degrees are taken as secondary indicators of
low status, a negative parameter is expected here, reﬂecting that
those with high out-degrees are less sought after for advice. Again,
theuseof a square rootmeasurepresumes thatdifferencesbetween
high out-degrees are relatively less important than the same dif-
ferences between lowout-degrees. Third, out-degree activity (sqrt)
is deﬁned as the out-degree of a judge times the square root of
his/her own out-degree, in other words, the out-degree raised to
the power 1.5. If its parameter is positive, judges who currently
ask many others for advice (presumably, low status judges), when
changing advisors, will have – compared to those who ask few
others for advice – a relatively stronger tendency to ask a new advi-
sor rather than drop an advisor. This is, again, a self-reinforcing
effect: a positive parameter will lead to increased dispersion of
out-degrees.
For the actor-level variables representing the hypotheses, we
estimate the following basic three effects (cf. Snijders et al., in this
issue): ego effects to account for their advice-seeking behavior,
alter effects for being sought out for advice, and similarity effects. A
positive ego parameter would indicate that judges with these char-
acteristics have a greater tendency to seek advice than others; a
positive alter parameter would indicate that others have a greater
tendency to seek advice from such judges; and a positive similarity
effect would indicate that judges who are similar with respect to
this attribute (both having it or both not having it) have a higher
tendency to seek advice from each other.
For the actor-level control variables of employment status, hav-
ing gone to a business school, and having gone to an elite school,
we specify similarity effects. The dyadic control variable of having
been member of the same chamber also is included in the model.
To bring out how the effects of formal status are related to
the endogenous network effects representing informal status, we
present results of two models. The ﬁrst is a model that includes the
variables representing formal status, values, and control variables
including reciprocity, but excluding the network-related effects
representing informal status and the triadic network effects. The
second is amodel including allmentioned effects. As theﬁrstmodel
shows how formal status affects advice giving without controlling
for informal status or network structure, it represents the conclu-
sions thatmightbedrawn ifonewould takeanattribute-dominated
view, ignoring network structure; the second model gives a more
adequateﬁt to the observeddata, and comparing the two shows the
extent to which attribute-related effects can be better represented
here as network-related effects.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptives
The in-degrees of the 86 judges who responded to the survey at
waves 1, 2, and 3 vary between 0 and 28 for the ﬁrst wave, between
0 and 40 for the second wave, and between 0 and 32 for the third
wave. Their out-degrees vary between 0 and 16 for the ﬁrst wave,
between0and23 for the secondwave, andbetween0and27 for the
third wave. Not only is the gap between minimum and maximum
value large, but the skewed distribution is also striking: at each
of the three waves, a large majority of individuals have very low
in-degree (0-2), while the number of judges with in-degrees of 20
Table 1
Two Siena models.
Model 1 Model 2
Rate parameters
Rate parameter period 1 9.75 (0.88) 12.06 (1.19)
Rate parameter period 2 14.15 (1.01) 21.56 (2.62)
Evaluation function parameters
Out-degree −1.74 (0.04) −3.13 (0.29)
Reciprocity 0.52 (0.10) 0.98 (0.14)
Transitive triplets – 0.19 (0.05)
Three-cycles – 0.06 (0.05)
In-degree popularity (sqrt) – 0.30 (0.05)
Out-degree popularity (sqrt) – −0.42 (0.11)
Out-degree activity (sqrt) – 0.33 (0.04)
Super-central advisors alter – 0.65 (0.17)
Super-central advisors ego – −0.04 (0.17)
Super-central advisors similarity – 0.21 (0.15)
President of Chamber alter 0.63 (0.06) 0.18 (0.07)
President of Chamber ego −0.24 (0.08) −0.08 (0.07)
President Rattaché alter 0.49 (0.07) 0.14 (0.08)
President Rattaché ego −0.33 (0.09) −0.13 (0.08)
Same Chamber 0.65 (0.06) 0.67 (0.06)
Banker-Lawyer alter 0.51 (0.08) 0.18 (0.09)
Banker-Lawyer ego −0.19 (0.09) −0.08 (0.08)
Banker-Lawyer similarity 0.12(0.08) 0.13 (0.08)
Business School similarity −0.08 (0.06) −0.08 (0.06)
Elite School similarity −0.13 (0.06) −0.01 (0.07)
Employment similarity 0.14 (0.05) 0.19 (0.05)
Punitive alter −0.39 (0.05) −0.10 (0.06)
Punitive ego −0.10 (0.06) 0.11 (0.06)
Punitive similarity 0.05 (0.05) 0.08 (0.06)
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ﬂWave −0.03 (0.07) −0.41 (0.08)
r more is 1, 3, and 6, respectively, at the three waves. Regarding
ut-degrees, the skewness is less strong but still remarkable: the
umber of judges with out-degrees of 15 or more is, respectively,
, 5, and 7.
.2. Parameter estimates
To test our hypotheses, we estimated two models using Siena,
ith the advice ties as dependent variables (Table 1). The dif-
erences between these two models were explained above. The
onvergence of the estimation algorithm was excellent in both
ases (all t-ratios for convergence less than .1, cf. the Siena man-
al). An analysis of the out-degree distribution (details not further
hown here) suggests that model 2 has an adequate ﬁt and
odel 1, which ignores most aspects of network structure, does
ot.
Let us comment on our results. The rate parameter accounts
or the amount of change between two subsequent observations
f the network, that is, the speed at which the dependent variable
the network) changes. It is calculated separately for each of the
woperiods, namely 2000–2002 and 2002–2005. All other parame-
ers are coefﬁcients of the objective function or network evaluation
unction, which is used to compare different states of the network
hen the actor makes a choice to maintain present ties, to add a
ew tie, or to delete an existing tie. If a parameter value is nil, the
orresponding effect does not drive network dynamics; if it is pos-
tive, then there will be a higher probability of moving toward a
ersonal network where the corresponding variable has a higher
alue5; and the opposite if it is negative.
5 More precisely in a dynamically evolving network, when a parameter for a
iven effect becomes higher, then the statistic that is representative of this effect
ill increase more strongly, or decrease more slowly; and, if the evolution would
un on undisturbed for a long time, the statistics would approximately stabilize by
uctuating about a higher value.On the whole Model 1 shows that, if one does not pay atten-
tion to network structure except for reciprocity effects, the formal
status indicators of presidency of Chambers and of being President
Rattaché have strong effects: these high-status actors are highly
sought for as advisors, and themselves seek less advice. In addition,
bankers–lawyers are often mentioned as advisors, and themselves
seek others less for advice; those with punitive attitudes are less
often mentioned as advisors. Having belonged to the same Cham-
ber, as a control variable, has a strong positive effect for advice
seeking.
InModel 2,which takes network structure into account and rep-
resents formal status by degrees, the effects of formal status and
punitive attitudes are much attenuated; what remains statistically
signiﬁcant is only that bankers–lawyers as well as Presidents of
Chambers tend to be asked for advice. Model 2 shows that, when
judges change their advisors, the individuals who are especially
sought as advisors are the super-central advisors, and those who
currently are much sought for advice by others.
Let us now look at the different parameters in greater detail.
Some of them (mainly in Model 2) refer to endogenous structural
effects that account for path-dependency innetworkdynamics. The
density effect is a basic indicator of network density and can be
interpreted as an intercept. The reciprocity effect is positive and
signiﬁcant and can be regarded as a tendency of judges to seek
advice from those who themselves sought advice from them. Tri-
adic level effects are only present in Model 2. Among them, the
transitive triplets effect is positive and signiﬁcant while the three-
cycles effect is not, which means that there is no sign of local
hierarchy in advice.
Therefore, evidence of status hierarchy in this advice network
must be searched at global rather than triadic level, and can
be captured by degree-related endogenous effects. Again, these
effects are only present in Model 2. As mentioned above, we have
included in-degree popularity, out-degree popularity, and out-
degree activity, all in square root form. In-degree popularity is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant: it signals a self-reinforcing
process in which judges who are central at a given point in time
see their centrality grow more strongly than others. Out-degree
popularity is negative and suggests that judges with high out-
degrees are less sought for advice, and the system moves towards
a relatively low correlation between in- and out-degrees. Finally,
out-degree activity is positive and signiﬁcant in Model 2. This
is a self-reinforcing effect that also points to a status hierarchy:
those who seek much advice remain in this role, so that the dis-
persion of out-degrees becomes or remains relatively high. To
summarize, our values for degree-related parameters conﬁrm the
existence of a strong status effect for judges with high in-degrees
and those with low out-degrees, whose high centrality is sustained
or increased over time. Super-central advisors, whose position
is based on the combination of their special responsibilities and
the self-reinforcing, one could say emergent, effects of their high
in-degree centrality, are accounted for in Model 2. They have a
positive alter effect that conﬁrms their attractiveness as advisors.
Formal status dimensions are taken into account both in Model
1 and in Model 2. The alter effects are positive for Presidents of
Chambers, indicating that these individuals have a higher ten-
dency to be consulted by others, so that their in-degree centrality
becomes, or is, relatively high. Instead, ego effects are negative,
suggesting that Presidents of Chamber tend to seek relatively less
advice than others. However, this effect is signiﬁcant only in Model
1, suggesting that it captures what is in fact an implication of
network structure in addition to formal positions. Similarly, the
parameters for Presidents Rattachés are signiﬁcant only in Model
1.
Models 1 and 2 control for Chamber co-membership: the pos-
itive parameter indicates that the tendency of judges to consult
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iresent or former Chamber co-members is one of the drivers
f the evolution of the advice network. Controls for the speci-
cities of professional groups are also introduced, in particular
o distinguish bankers-lawyers from other judges. The Banker-
awyer alter parameter, positive in both models, is evidence that
udges from the banking sector and with legal background are
ifferentially attractive as advisors; instead, the ego and simi-
arity parameters are not signiﬁcant (though the ego effect is
igniﬁcant in Model 1). Other homophily effects such as having
een in a business school or an elite school do not signiﬁcantly
ffect judges’ advice-seeking behavior, while in both Model 1 and
odel 2, a positive similarity effect results from employment sta-
us.
Regarding punitivity, three different effects capture the extent
o which judges’ choices of advisors reﬂect the fact that a majority
f them self-identiﬁed as punitive: an alter effect, to check whether
unitive judges tend to be more, or less, selected as advisors than
thers; an ego effect, to look at the tendency of punitive judges
o seek more, or less, advice than others; and ﬁnally, a similar-
ty effect, to establish the extent to which judges tend to select
s advisors those among them who also have the same attitude in
his respect. They are not signiﬁcant in Model 2 although the alter
ffect is signiﬁcant, and negative, in Model 1. This suggests that
he apparent unattractiveness of punitive judges as advisors, that
odel 1 suggests, captures in fact the differential attractiveness
f super-central advisors, and judges with high in-degrees more
enerally – who are mostly non-punitive.
Finally, we have added a wave effect to control for differences
n average degree over the waves.
To sum up, our analyses provide evidence that the mitigation
ffect holds for Chamber similarity and employment status simi-
arity, but not for normative homophily. In termsof our hypotheses,
1a and H1b are conﬁrmed: members of an organized setting are
ore likely to seek advice from colleagues of higher status, and the
tatus of those with highest status will tend to be reinforced over
ime. H2 is only partly conﬁrmed: it is conﬁrmed for in-degrees (if
n-degrees may be regarded as a particular type of ascribed char-
cteristic); but it cannot be said that members are more likely to
eek advice frommemberswithwhom they share any ascribed and
nherited characteristics; instead only some common characteris-
ics can help mitigate Blau’s rule of status. In particular, H3 is not
onﬁrmed: members are not more likely to seek advice from mem-
erswithwhom they share the same values. Normative homophily
s not strong enough to serve as a basis for mitigation of status
ames. This result is strengthened by the fact that H4 is conﬁrmed:
ver time, members are more likely to seek advice especially from
olleagues with higher status, and whether they share the same
alues is not a clearly determining factor.
These results may be interpreted in two different ways. Either
hared norms do not have a “pure” mitigating effect on choices
f advisors; or when there is a normative struggle at the top of
his kind of organization, normative mitigation of the costs asso-
iated with choosing advisors is weakened, and normative choices
ecome an additional signal of alignment, of taking a stand in a
ontroversy, not a mitigation device. In this situation, we have a
ormative radicalization/politicization of issues at the top of the
op with a very small number of elite advisors. This sidelines the
itigation effect. Norms and value judgments in a strongly hier-
rchical and conﬂictual network do not help mitigate; rather their
xpression becomes a form of alignment and participation in the
truggle with consequences for the collective learning process.. Discussion and conclusion
The selection of advisors in organizations is important because
t has an effect on collective learning, an important processin the knowledge economy. In this study, we conﬁrm previ-
ous work showing that advice seeking converges towards senior
and recognized members with status. Status effects are com-
plex: there is a status equalizing process among judges who are
not super-central advisors; but there is a status accumulation
process among super-central advisors who become increasingly
central over time and who seek each other for advice. We
also conﬁrm that members use certain similarities (chamber co-
membership, employment status) with alters in order to mitigate
the strong status rule. We look for a speciﬁc form of norma-
tive homophily but ﬁnd that, over time, similarities in terms
of normative choices do not have a direct effect on the selec-
tion of advisors. In our case study, advice seeking does converge
towards central and super-central members and reﬂects a pro-
cess of cognitive alignment on such members who gained the
‘authority to know’, who provide social approval for speciﬁc deci-
sions.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm that this alignment is a key ingredient
of intra-organizational learning, but we do not ﬁnd a mitigating
effect of norms on status games. The status hierarchy remains the
social incentive for judges to share their knowledge and experience
with others, thus helping in explaining the social organization of
the learning process. As stated in the theoretical background sec-
tion, this contradicts traditional sociological theories that expect a
“pure” effect of norms and socialization on behavior, independent
of status effects. In our speciﬁc dataset, central judges are mostly
punitive and super-central ones usually non-punitive. Learning in
sucha context seems todependmoreonconformity viaprogressive
alignment on the norm promoted by the elite, than on the percep-
tion of shared norms and values per se. This is not to say that other
effects, including different dimensions of homophily than norma-
tive homophily, would not emerge as signiﬁcant in an analysis that
does not focus on the relationship between norms, status, and rela-
tional turnover.
These ﬁndings also raise questions about the issue of the impact
of controversies and the adherence to norms on the dynamics of
advice networks. As far as our case study is concerned, norms do
not, on their own, drive the evolution of the advice network of
the organization. This effect is likely to be less mechanical and
more complex than the sociological tradition would suggest. Alter
is not selected as an exchange partner solely because one thinks
him/her inclined to share the same values and norms. At least
in professional environments, if we look for a separate effect of
values on relational choice, this effect has every chance of prov-
ing to be elusive. The actors may only take norms and values into
account through the negotiation of the terms of the exchanges in
which they engage with partners already positioned within struc-
ture and power relationships. Actors endogenize the structure at
the moment of selecting exchange partners and of referring to a
principle guiding their decisions. Our results suggest that future
research in this area should look foracloser linkbetweennormsand
social ties in their co-evolution. Norms, behaviors, and structures
should evolve together, and it is ultimately through the formal-
ized study of this co-evolution in greatly varied controversies that
a more sophisticated theory of individual and collective action will
be built.
Finally, the scope of these conclusions is potentially wide. For
example we might expect the relative effects of status and norma-
tive homophily on the selection of advisors over time to be similar
in other organizationswith a strong hierarchy. Suchhypotheses are
a matter for future and cumulative research.Acknowledgements
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